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Abstract
Differences in cognitive sophistication and effort are at the root of behavioral het-
erogeneity in economics. To explain this heterogeneity, behavioral models assume 
that certain choices indicate higher cognitive effort. A fundamental problem with 
this approach is that observing a choice does not reveal how the choice is made, and 
hence choice data is insufficient to establish the link between cognitive effort and 
behavior. We show that deliberation times provide an individually-measurable cor-
relate of cognitive effort. We test a model of heterogeneous cognitive depth, incor-
porating stylized facts from the psychophysical literature, which makes predictions 
on the relation between choices, cognitive effort, incentives, and deliberation times. 
We confirm the predicted relations experimentally in different kinds of games.
Keywords Heterogeneity · Iterative reasoning · Cognitive sophistication · 
Deliberation times · Depth of reasoning · Cognitive effort
JEL Classification C72 · C91 · D80 · D91
1 Introduction
Economic agents form different expectations and react differently even when con-
fronted with the same information, leading to substantial behavioral heterogeneity, 
which in turn has long been recognized as a fundamental aspect of economic inter-
actions (e.g., Haltiwanger and Waldman 1985; Kirman 1992; Blundell and Stoker 
2005; Von  Gaudecker et  al. 2011). A key source of heterogeneity is the fact that 
cognitive capacities differ among individuals, as does the motivation to exert cogni-
tive effort. This observation has given rise to a rich theoretical literature on iterative 
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or stepwise reasoning processes, including level-k models (Stahl 1993; Nagel 1995; 
Stahl and Wilson 1995; Ho et  al. 1998) and models of cognitive hierarchies 
(Camerer et  al. 2004). Such models endow individuals with differing degrees of 
strategic sophistication or reasoning capabilities, and might hold the key to describe 
heterogeneity in observed behavior (for a recent survey, see Crawford et al. 2013). In 
particular, they have proven invaluable to explain behavioral puzzles as overbidding 
in auctions (Crawford and Iriberri 2007), overcommunication in sender-receiver 
games (Cai and Wang 2006), coordination in market-entry games (Camerer et  al. 
2004), and why communication sometimes improves coordination and sometimes 
hampers it (Ellingsen and Östling 2010). More recently, a small but growing litera-
ture in macroeconomics has started to incorporate heterogeneity in cognitive depth 
and iterative thinking (Angeletos and Lian 2017), leading to promising insights 
on the effects of monetary policy (Farhi and Werning 2019) or low interest rates 
(García-Schmidt and Woodford 2019).
Existing models of heterogeneity in cognitive depth, however, face a funda-
mental problem. Choices are classified into different cognitive categories assumed 
to require different levels of cognitive effort. So far, there is little direct evidence 
linking observed play to cognitive effort. Most of the experimental literature has 
used observed choices to infer an individual’s depth of reasoning from the associ-
ated cognitive categories. Hence, the observation of a given choice is used to infer 
cognitive effort taking the underlying path of reasoning or thought processes that 
led to the classification of choices as given, creating an essentially circular argu-
ment. One problem with this approach is that the same choice is always attributed to 
the same level of cognitive effort, although it might very well be the result of com-
pletely different decision rules. For example, an agent choosing an alternative after a 
complex cognitive process and another agent choosing the same alternative because 
of some payoff-irrelevant salient features cannot be distinguished on the basis of 
those choices alone. As a consequence, the level of cognitive effort associated with a 
choice becomes a non-testable assumption, and the sources of heterogeneity remain 
in the dark. A case in point is the work of Goeree et  al. (2018), who identified a 
game where imputing cognitive depth from choices alone leads to clearly unreason-
able conclusions, in the form of abnormally high imputed cognitive levels.
To establish that the source of observed behavioral heterogeneity is actually het-
erogeneity in cognitive effort and capacities, what is needed are individually meas-
urable correlates of cognitive effort beyond choice data. That is, instead of identify-
ing particular choices with particular levels of cognitive effort, one needs to provide 
a direct measure of effort which allows to independently show that certain choices 
actually are the result of stronger cognitive effort. We argue that response times, 
or, more properly in our context, deliberation times can be fruitfully used for this 
purpose.
We focus on deliberation times for two reasons. First, they are easy to collect in 
standard experimental laboratories, without any need for additional equipment. Sec-
ond, within the context of iterative thinking, it is safe to assume that the total delib-
eration time for a decision reduces to the sum of deliberation times for the individual 
steps. In principle, other psychophysiological correlates of cognitive effort could be 
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used in place of deliberation times.1 A notable example is pupil dilation, because 
the eye’s pupil dilates with the amount of mental effort exerted in a task (Kahneman 
and Beatty 1966; Alós-Ferrer et al. 2019). However, it is unclear at this point how to 
disentangle the individual contributions of thinking steps to phasic pupil dilation for 
a single decision.
In the present work, we test a simple model linking cognitive sophistication to 
choices and deliberation times, taking into account stylized facts from the psycho-
physiological literature on response times. We build on Alaoui and Penta’s (2016a) 
model of endogenous depth of reasoning, which postulates that players proceed iter-
atively, making an additional step of reasoning if the value of doing so exceeds its 
cognitive cost. Specifically, the value of reasoning, which depends on the payoffs of 
the game, essentially corresponds to the highest possible payoff improvement result-
ing from an additional step of thinking. This model delivers a first, straightforward 
prediction, namely that higher incentives will result in additional steps of reasoning 
and hence more cognitively sophisticated choices (Prediction 1). Alaoui and Penta 
(2016a) conducted an experiment confirming this prediction.
We take this model as a starting step and enrich it by linking steps of reasoning 
to deliberation times. The total deliberation time of an observed choice is assumed 
to be the sum of the deliberation times for the chain of intermediate steps. That is, 
if arriving at a choice through iterative thinking requires seven steps, deliberation 
time is the sum of the times associated with the seven corresponding, intermedi-
ate steps. This natural structure suffices to derive a further prediction, namely that 
choices involving more steps of reasoning should be associated with longer delibera-
tion times (Prediction 2).
Further predictions depend on the properties of the function relating value of 
reasoning and the time required for each step of thinking. Suppose that the time 
required for a given step were independent of the associated value of reasoning. This 
would automatically imply that higher incentives lead to longer deliberation times, 
since the former would result in more steps of reasoning (Prediction  3).2 How-
ever, this prediction might be implausible, because the assumption it rests on is at 
odds with received empirical evidence. This is due to a well-known phenomenon 
in psychology and neuroscience (going back to, at least, Cattell 1902 and Dashiell 
1937), according to which easier choice problems (where alternatives’ evaluations 
show large differences) take less time to respond to than harder problems. Hence, 
deliberation times are longer for alternatives that are more similar, either in terms of 
preference or along a predefined scale. This so-called chronometric effect has also 
been shown to be present in various economic settings such as intertemporal choice 
(Chabris et al. 2009), risk (Alós-Ferrer and Garagnani 2018), consumer choice (Kra-
jbich et al. 2010; Krajbich and Rangel 2011) as well as in dictator and ultimatum 
1 Many such correlates have been explored in the literature on mental effort, fatigue, and stress in cogni-
tive science and neuroscience (see, e.g., Hockey 2013).
2 Alaoui and Penta (2016b) make this assumption in a study on attention allocation and cognitive costs 
across games of different complexity. However, their focus is very different from ours and they do not 
test Prediction 3.
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games (Krajbich et al. 2015). Alós-Ferrer et al. (2018) examine the consequences of 
the chronometric effect for revealed preference, and Alós-Ferrer et al. (2016) show 
that it helps explain and understand preference reversals in decisions under risk. 
This effect follows naturally when the choice process is captured by a drift diffusion 
model (DDM) (Ratcliff 1978), a class of models that has been applied extensively in 
cognitive psychology and neuroscience, and which is receiving increasing attention 
in economics (Chabris et al. 2009; Fudenberg et al. 2018; Baldassi et al. 2019; Webb 
2019).3
In accordance with this evidence, it should be expected that the deliberation time 
for a given step of thinking is larger the smaller the value of reasoning for that step. 
This leads to the prediction that, fixing the number of steps required for a choice, 
the associated total deliberation time should become shorter as the value of reason-
ing of the corresponding steps increases (Prediction 4). Thus, increasing the value 
of reasoning (e.g., by increasing incentives) has a twofold effect. On the one hand, 
it will lead to a larger number of steps of reasoning (Prediction 1), hence, in princi-
ple, resulting in longer deliberation times through Prediction 2. On the other hand, 
the deliberation times per step will be shorter (Prediction 4). As a result, the total 
effect on deliberation times is indeterminate. In particular, increasing the value of 
reasoning can result in shorter total deliberation times, in direct contradiction with 
Prediction 3.
We tested Predictions 1–4 in a laboratory experiment.4 Our design included two 
different games commonly used to study iterative thinking (and, in particular, level-k 
reasoning): the beauty contest game (or guessing game; Nagel 1995), which is the 
workhorse in that literature, and several variants of the 11–20 money request game, 
recently introduced by Arad and Rubinstein (2012), in the graphical version of 
Goeree et al. (2018). Given the standard level-0 behavior in the 11–20 game, these 
variants all share the same path of reasoning, usually assumed to result from iterated 
application of the best-reply operator, but we systematically manipulate the payoff 
structures to vary the value of reasoning and test our predictions.
In the beauty contest game we find longer deliberation times for choices com-
monly associated with more steps of reasoning, confirming the basic prediction of 
our model that deliberation time is increasing in cognitive effort (Prediction 2). That 
is, the beauty contest game, a game where there is little doubt that level-k reasoning 
is prevalent, serves as a basic validation of the relationship between cognitive effort 
and deliberation times. This prediction is also confirmed in the 11–20 game, that is, 
4 In order to use deliberation times, the experimenter needs to make sure that distraction arising from 
other tasks is minimized, and hence the measured deliberation times can actually be linked to the task of 
interest. This is easier in the controlled environment of an experimental laboratory, which minimizes var-
iance in stimuli beyond the decision screen and allows basic supervision. Further, laboratory experiments 
(as opposed to online ones) avoid network delays, which might increase noise in collected deliberation 
times. However, we acknowledge that online experiments offer the chance to greatly increase the number 
of observations, which could counteract other difficulties.
3 The chronometric effect leads to the apparently counterintuitive conclusion that low-stake choices, 
where the decision-maker is closer to indifference, take more time than high-stake choices (Krajbich 
et al. 2014). A better interpretation, along the lines of Fudenberg et al. (2018), is that finding out that one 
is close to indifference is harder and more time-consuming than realizing that a clear preference exists.
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again deliberation times are longer for higher-level choices. Thus, in both games our 
data verifies the assumed connection between observed level and cognitive effort in 
support of level-k reasoning.
To test the remaining predictions, we take advantage of the fact that our imple-
mentations of the 11–20 game systematically vary incentive levels. In agreement 
with Prediction 1 and with the results in Alaoui and Penta (2016a), we find a sys-
tematic effect of incentives on the observed depth of reasoning as predicted by the 
model, that is, higher incentives are associated with an increase in higher-level 
choices. We also find shorter deliberation times when incentives are increased, even 
though observed depth of reasoning is increased. This result directly contradicts Pre-
diction 3, implying that decision times per step are not independent of incentives. It 
is, however, fully compatible with Prediction 4 and the assumption that deliberation 
times per step are decreasing in the value of reasoning. A regression analysis then 
allows us to provide more direct evidence in favor of this latter property.
In summary, we show that heterogeneity in behavior can be traced back to het-
erogeneity in cognitive effort by using deliberation times as a direct correlate of 
the latter rather than exogenously identifying choices with different levels of cogni-
tive effort. More generally, our results show that deliberation times can be used as 
a tool to study cognitive sophistication. In particular, this provides a direct correlate 
of cognitive effort which avoids potentially-circular arguments where observing a 
choice is used to impute a higher cognitive effort because higher cognitive effort 
would have resulted in that choice. In the absence of this correlate, one might be 
led to draw wrong conclusions if models of iterative thinking are applied without an 
external way of testing for heterogeneity. In the Appendix, we provide an example of 
a variant of the 11–20 game (following Goeree et al. 2018) where deliberation times 
suggest that imputing higher levels of cognitive effort from certain choices might be 
unwarranted.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly relates our work to the litera-
ture. Section 3 introduces the model and derives the predictions. Section 4 describes 
the experimental design. Section  5 presents the results of the experiment for the 
beauty contest. Section 6 presents the results on depth of reasoning and delibera-
tion times (Prediction 2) for the 11–20 games. Section 7 presents the results on the 
effect of incentives for those games (Predictions 1, 3, 4). Section 8 discusses and 
summarizes our findings. The Appendix contains two additional variants of the 
11–20 game, and the Online Appendix discusses the robustness of our findings with 
respect to alternative level-0 specifications.
2  Related literature
A number of publications have studied the relation between cognitive ability, cogni-
tive sophistication, and depth of reasoning. Brañas-Garza et  al. (2012), Carpenter 
et al. (2013), and Gill and Prowse (2016) relate higher cognitive ability (as meas-
ured, e.g., by the Cognitive Reflection Test or the Raven test) with more steps of rea-
soning in the beauty contest game. Further, Fehr and Huck (2016) find that subjects 
whose cognitive ability is below a certain threshold lack strategic awareness, that 
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is, they randomly choose numbers from the whole interval. Using a choice process 
protocol where answers can be adjusted continuously, Agranov et al. (2015) study 
empirically how strategic sophistication develops over time in the beauty contest 
game and find that sophisticated players show evidence of increased understanding 
as time passes. A few studies have also used causal manipulations to impair cog-
nitive resources. Lindner and Sutter (2013) found that under time pressure behav-
ior in the 11–20 game was closer to the Nash equilibrium, although the authors 
acknowledge that the shift might partly be driven by random play and thus should be 
interpreted with caution. In contrast, Spiliopoulos et al. (2018) find no evidence for 
Nash equilibrium play under time pressure. Instead, subjects exhibit a shift to less 
complex decision rules (requiring fewer elementary operations to execute) under 
time pressure in various 3 × 3 games; this shift is primarily driven by a significant 
increase in the proportion of level-1 players.
There is also a small but growing literature employing sources of evidence 
beyond choice data that suggests that individuals follow step-wise reasoning pro-
cesses in certain settings. In a repeated p-beauty contest Gill and Prowse (2018) 
show that subjects who think for longer on average win more rounds and choose 
lower numbers closer to the equilibrium. Bhatt and Camerer (2005) and Coricelli 
and Nagel (2009) show that iterative reasoning in different games, including the 
beauty contest game, and very specially “thinking about thinking,” correlates with 
neural activity in areas of the brain associated with mentalizing (Theory of Mind 
network; see Alós-Ferrer 2018a), building a notable bridge between social neuro-
science and game theory. Other works have relied on eye-tracking measurements 
or click patterns recorded via MouseLab to obtain information on search behavior, 
which is then used to make inferences regarding level-k reasoning (Costa-Gomes 
et al. 2001; Crawford and Costa-Gomes 2006; Polonio et al. 2015; Polonio and Cori-
celli 2019; Zonca et al. 2019).
Clearly, our work is also related to recent work employing response times in eco-
nomics. Examples include the studies of risky decision making by Wilcox (1993; 
1994), the web-based studies of Rubinstein (2007; 2013), and recent studies as 
Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer (2014) and Alós-Ferrer et al. (2016).5 To date, however, 
only a few works in economics have explicitly incorporated response times in mod-
els of reasoning. Chabris et al. (2009) study the allocation of time across decision 
problems. Their model is similar in spirit to ours in that it is motivated by the chron-
ometric “closeness-to-indifference” effect. In particular, they also model response 
time as a decreasing function of differences in expected utility. However, in contrast 
to our model they focus on binary intertemporal choices and do not consider itera-
tive reasoning. They report empirical evidence that choices among options whose 
expected utilities are closer require more time, thus indicating an inverse relation-
ship between response times and utility differences. They argue in favor of the view 
that decision making is a cognitively costly activity that allocates time according to 
cost–benefit principles.
5 For a recent discussion of the benefits, challenges, and desiderata of response time analysis in experi-
mental economics see Spiliopoulos and Ortmann (2018).
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Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer (2014) and Alós-Ferrer (2018b) consider a dual-pro-
cess model of response times in simple, binary decisions where different decision 
processes interact in order to arrive at a choice. The emphasis of the model, how-
ever, is on the effects of conflict and alignment among processes, that is, whether a 
particular decision process or heuristic supports a more (normatively) rational one 
or rather leads the decision maker astray. The predictions of the model help under-
stand when errors, defined as deviations from a normatively rational process, are 
faster or slower than correct responses.
Finally, our work sheds light on the recent literature exploring the limits of mod-
els of iterative thinking, as the experiment of Goeree et al. (2018) mentioned above. 
It has been pointed out that strategic sophistication, as captured by level-k models, 
might be heavily dependent on the situation at hand. Hargreaves Heap et al. (2014) 
suggest that even (allegedly-nonstrategic) level-0 behavior might depend on the stra-
tegic structure of the game. In a repeated beauty contest, Gill and Prowse (2018) 
found that the level of strategic reasoning also depends on the complexity of the 
situation in the previous round. Georganas et al. (2015) show that strategic sophis-
tication can be largely persistent within a given class of games but not necessarily 
across different classes of games. That is, the congruence between level-k models 
and subjects’ actual decision processes may depend on the context. Allred et  al. 
(2016) complement this result showing that the implications of available cognitive 
resources on strategic behavior are not persistent across classes of games. These dif-
ficulties raise the question of whether models of iterative thinking can be actually 
understood as procedural, that is, as describing how decisions are actually arrived 
at, or rather as purely descriptive, outcome-based models. Further, if iterative think-
ing cannot be taken as a persistent mode of behavior (across individuals and across 
games), it becomes particularly important to identify what triggers its use and in 
which situations it conflicts with other decision rules. Again, choice data alone is not 
sufficient to answer these questions.
3  The model
We model decision making as a process of iterative reasoning as put forward in the 
literature on iterative thinking (Stahl 1993; Nagel 1995; Stahl and Wilson 1995; Ho 
et al. 1998). Our approach is based on Alaoui and Penta (2016a), who model step-
wise-reasoning procedures as the result of a cost–benefit analysis. A player’s depth 
of reasoning is endogenously determined depending on both individual cognitive 
ability and the payoffs of the game. That is, each step of reasoning requires a cer-
tain understanding of the strategic situation modeled by an incremental cognitive 
cost. On the other hand, the benefit of an additional step, the value of reasoning, is 
assumed to depend on the payoff structure of the game. Behavior then follows from 
a combination of depth of reasoning and beliefs about the reasoning process of the 
opponent.6
6 For the sake of tractability, we will assume that a player’s depth of reasoning pins down his behavior, 
although more generally observed play may depend on his beliefs over the opponents as well. In this 
case, depth of reasoning determines a player’s capacity, that is, the maximum number of steps he is able 
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3.1  The path of reasoning
We present the model for a symmetric, two-player game  = (S,) with finite strat-
egy space S and payoff function  ∶ S × S ⟶ ℝ . To economize on notation we 
focus on the two player case, but the extension to the N-player case is straightfor-
ward. Following Alaoui and Penta (2016a), a path of reasoning for   is a sequence 
of (possibly mixed) strategies (s∗
k
)
k∈ℕ . Strategy s
∗
0
 is the starting point or anchor for 
the path of reasoning, representing the default strategy a player not engaging in any 
deliberation would choose. As player i performs the first round of introspection, 
he becomes aware that his opponent may choose s∗
0
 , and thus considers to choose 
the next step strategy s∗
1
 . A process of iterative thinking can then be interpreted as 
a sequence of steps of reasoning along the induced path of reasoning (s∗
k
)
k∈ℕ : For 
example, in step k player i, who intends to play s∗
k−1
 after k − 1 rounds of introspec-
tion, realizes that j may have reached the same conclusion, that is, to play s∗
k−1
 . 
Hence, in step k player i considers choosing s∗
k
.
A standard level-k model delivers a path of reasoning as follows. Let s∗
0
 be the 
assumed level-0 strategy adopted by non-strategic players. Denote by BR
i
∶  ⇉ S 
i’s best-response correspondence where  is the set of mixed strategies over S. For 
simplicity, we assume that for any s ∈ S there is a unique best-reply, denoted by 









) for each k ≥ 1.









.7 Player i’s cognitive costs represent his cognitive abili-
ties, or in other words, how difficult it is for i to reach the next level of understand-







 . Cognitive costs are player-specific, but the value of rea-
soning depends on the payoffs of the game.
For concreteness, we will assume that the value of reasoning takes the following 
“maximum-gain representation” (Alaoui and Penta 2016a):
That is, the value of reasoning is the maximum gain the player could obtain by 
choosing the optimal strategy compared to his current strategy, at step k, for all pos-
sible actions of the other player. In a sense, the player is optimistic about the value 
of thinking more, considering the highest possible payoff improvement.
Player i stops the process of iterative reasoning as soon as the cost exceeds the 
value of an additional step of reasoning. Thus, player i’s depth of reasoning is 
given by K
i
(𝛤 ) = min{k ∈ ℕ ∣ v
i
(k + 1) < c
i
(k + 1)} if the set is nonempty, and 
K
i















or willing to conduct. This upper bound is binding, if he believes that his opponent has reached a deeper 
level of understanding than he has, but otherwise may not. Alaoui and Penta (2016a) discuss and test 
experimentally the effects on behavior when beliefs are varied systematically.
7 ℕ denotes the set of natural numbers including zero, and ℕ
+
 the set of natural numbers without zero.
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As Alaoui and Penta (2016a) point out, in this model players act as if they com-
pare the value of additional rounds of reasoning and the cognitive costs. This is not 
to be taken literally, and in particular it is not assumed that this cost–benefit analysis 
is performed consciously. If it were, one would obtain an infinite regress problem 
where reasoning about the cost of reasoning would be costly in itself, and so on. 
Alaoui and Penta (2016c) provide an axiomatic characterization of the cost–benefit 
representation. Also, the model abstracts from well-known non-monotonicities in 
the relation between incentives and performance, as choking under pressure (Yerkes 
and Dodson 1908; Ariely et al. 2009) or, ceiling effects (Samuelson and Bazerman 
1985).
The model delivers a first prediction on how systematic changes in the pay-
off structure affect the depth of reasoning. Consider two games  = (, S) and 





These games are equally difficult to reason about, or cognitively equivalent (Alaoui 
and Penta 2016a), hence induce the same cognitive costs. However, the value of rea-
soning may vary even among cognitively equivalent games, since it depends on the 




 the value of reasoning induced by 
the payoff structure in   and  ′ , respectively. We say that  ′ has higher incentives 




(k) . If  ′ has higher incentives to reason than 
  for every step k with k ≤ K
i






(k) for all k ≤ K
i
( ) , which 
implies K
i
( �) ≥ K
i
( ) . This yields the following prediction.
Prediction 1 Suppose   and  ′ are cognitively equivalent. If  ′ has higher incen-
tives to reason than   for all steps up to k = K
i
( ) , then  ′ induces weakly more 
steps of reasoning for player i than   , that is, K
i
( �) ≥ K
i
( ).
3.2  Deliberation times
We now extend the model presented above by linking iterative thinking to delibera-
tion times. For this purpose, we assume that the deliberation time for conducting k 











(k)) is the time 
required by player i to conduct the kth step of reasoning. The total deliberation time 
of player i in a given game   to perform k = K
i
(𝛤 ) > 0 steps of reasoning is then 
given by
We say that a strategy s requires more steps of reasoning than s′ if s = s∗
k
 and s� = s∗
k�
 
with k > k′ . The following prediction is then straightforward.
Prediction 2 For a given game   , deliberation time for a choice is longer if it 
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Further predictions depend on the properties of the time functions k
i
 . The sim-
plest possibility is to assume that, within a class of cognitive equivalent games, the 
time of each given step of reasoning is independent of the value of reasoning v
i
(k) . 






 for some constant 𝜏k
i
> 0 . This addi-
tional assumption would lead to the following prediction (see also Alaoui and Penta 
2016b).
Prediction 3 Suppose k
i
(⋅) is constant for each k. If   and  ′ are cognitively 




(k) for all k, then 
T
i
( �) ≥ T
i
( ).
The intuition is simple. A higher value of reasoning leads to more steps of reason-
ing, that is, K
i
( �) ≥ K
i
( ) (with a strict inequality if the increase in value is large 
enough) and since k
i
(⋅) is assumed to be constant, it follows that T
i
( �) ≥ T
i
( ).
However, the assumption that response time is independent of underlying differ-
ences in value is at odds with widespread empirical evidence. It is a well-known 
observation in neuroeconomics and psychology that deliberation times are longer 
for alternatives that are more similar (Dashiell 1937). This in turn follows naturally 
from sequential sampling models from cognitive psychology (Ratcliff 1978; Fuden-
berg et al. 2018). As already mentioned in the introduction, this effect has also been 
established in various economic settings such as intertemporal choice (Chabris et al. 
2009), risk (Alós-Ferrer and Garagnani 2018), consumer choice (Krajbich et  al. 
2010; Krajbich and Rangel 2011) as well as in dictator and ultimatum games (Kra-
jbich et al. 2015).
This evidence suggests that the deliberation time for a given step of thinking 





should be decreasing in the value of reasoning v
i
(k) . This leads to a different 
prediction.




(k)) is decreasing in v
i
(k) . Consider two cognitively 
equivalent games   and  ′ . If  ′ has a higher value of reasoning, then the delibera-
tion time for a choice that requires k steps of reasoning is shorter in  ′ than in   , 

























For a fixed number of steps of thinking, this predicts shorter deliberation times 
for higher incentives, because a player requires less time for each step. However, this 
does not necessarily imply that one should observe shorter total deliberation times 
for larger incentives, because for larger incentives subjects may also conduct more 
steps of thinking (Prediction 1), which in turn increases overall deliberation time. 
Thus, under the assumption of a decreasing time function, larger incentives have a 
twofold effect with (weakly) more steps of reasoning on the one hand and shorter 
deliberation times per step on the other hand. As a consequence, if per-step delibera-
tion time depends on the value of reasoning, Prediction 3 does not necessarily hold.
Last, we remark on the role of individual cognitive ability. The model does not 
directly make any assumptions on the relation between differences in cognitive 
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ability across individuals and differences in cognitive costs. There are, however, 
two conceivable ways in which individual differences in cognitive ability may 
affect choices and deliberation times. One the one hand, one could assume that 
higher cognitive ability translates into uniformly lower cognitive costs of reason-
ing, c
i
 . In that case, players with higher cognitive ability would be predicted to con-
duct weakly more steps of reasoning, because K�
i
( ) ≥ K
i





all 0 < k ≤ K
i
(𝛤 ) . Since total deliberation time is the sum of one-step deliberation 
times, conducting more steps tends to increase total deliberation time. On the other 
hand, even under this additional assumption, it is unclear how higher cognitive abil-
ity would translate into deliberation times per step. Both longer deliberation times, 
e.g. because higher cognitive ability leads to more thorough thinking, or shorter 
deliberation times, e.g. because performing a step of reasoning is easier for higher 
ability individuals, are conceivable, so that the overall effect on deliberation times 
is indeterminate. Importantly, cognitive costs are assumed to be affected only by the 
strategic structure of the game, the path of reasoning, and potentially by individual 
cognitive ability. Thus, fixing individual cognitive ability, the effects of changes in 
the incentive structure described above remain unaffected as long as the path of rea-
soning (or more generally the difficulty) of the game is not altered.
4  Experimental design
We use two games commonly employed to study cognitive sophistication, the clas-
sical beauty contest game (Nagel 1995) and the 11–20 money request game, a more 
recent alternative that was explicitly designed to study level-k behavior (Arad and 
Rubinstein 2012). We ask whether a higher level of reasoning (in the standard level-
k sense) is reflected in higher cognitive effort, or in other words, whether there is a 
direct link between higher levels of reasoning and deliberation times. We use differ-
ent versions of the 11–20 game that vary the incentives, that is, the value of reason-
ing, while leaving the underlying best-reply structure, and thus the path of reason-
ing, unaffected. This allows us to study how choices and deliberation times react to 
systematic changes in the payoff structure providing a direct test of the implications 
of the model presented in Sect. 3.
4.1  The beauty contest game
The standard workhorse for the study of cognitive sophistication is the guessing 
game, or p-beauty contest game (Nagel 1995). We use a standard, one-shot, beauty 
contest game with p = 2∕3 with discrete strategy space S = {0, 1,… , 99, 100} . In 
this game, a population of N players has to simultaneously guess an integer number 
between 0 and 100. The winner is the person whose guess is closest to p times the 
average of all chosen numbers. The winner receives a fixed prize P, split equally 
among all winners in case of a tie.
In this game it is usually assumed that non-strategic (level-0) players pick a num-
ber at random from the uniform distribution over {0,… , 100} . Hence, we assume 
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that the starting point for the level-k path of reasoning, s∗
0
 , is the mixed strategy 
that assigns equal probability to all numbers. If a player thinks that all other play-
ers choose s∗
0
 , then (for N large enough) the average of all numbers chosen is (close 
to) 50 and hence the best reply to s∗
0
 is to choose s∗
1
= 33 , that is the integer closest 
to 2/3 times 50 (see, e.g., Breitmoser 2012). As a player performs the next step, 
he becomes aware that his opponents might choose 33 as well, and thus consid-
ers choosing a best-reply to a profile where all other players choose 33. Hence, the 
level-2 strategy is s∗
2
= 22 , the integer closest to 2/3 times 33.8 Iterating, this defines 






 is the integer closest to (2∕3)s∗
k−1
 for k > 0.9 
If N is large enough, this game has two Nash equilibria at 0 and 1 (Seel and Tsakas 
2017).
The value of reasoning at each step is the same and equals the prize P. To see 




 yields a payoff improvement of P for any 




) . Since this 
is the maximum possible gain, it follows that v(k) = P.
4.2  The 11–20 game
The second part of our experiment focuses on variants of the 11–20 money request 
game (Arad and Rubinstein 2012). A modified version of this game was also 
employed by Alaoui and Penta (2016a) to test their model of endogenous depth of 
reasoning. Goeree et al. (2018) introduced a graphical version of the 11–20 game 
that allows to vary the payoff structure without affecting the underlying best-reply 
structure of the game. We now describe a generalized version of this graphical 
11–20 game. In what follows, we will refer to this game (and variants thereof) sim-
ply as “11–20 game.”
Consider ten boxes horizontally aligned and numbered from 9 (far left) to 
0 (far right) as depicted in the upper part of Fig. 1. Each box b ∈ {1,… , 9} con-
tains an amount A
b
< 20 and the rightmost box, b = 0 , contains the highest 
amount of A
0
= 20 . There are two players, i = 1, 2 , and each has to choose a box 
b
i
∈ {0,… , 9} . Each player receives the amount A
b
i
 in the box he chose plus a bonus 
of R > 0 if he chose the box that is exactly one to the left of his opponent’s box. That 
















+ R if b
i
= b−i + 1.
8 In general, given a population profile the beauty contest game does not have a unique best-reply, since 
if all other players choose 33 any number smaller than 33 will be closer to the average of 22. However, 
choosing exactly the average becomes the unique best-response if a player expects that it is possible that 
some opponents might randomize and every single strategy might be played with (possibly very small) 
positive probability.
9 This delivers the path (s∗
0
, 33, 22, 15, 10, 7, 5, 3, 2, 1, 1,…) , which is close to that defined by (2∕3)k50 
for k > 0 . Of course, this is an approximation which ignores the impact of the player on the average, but 
is accurate unless N is small.
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A feature of this game is that choosing box 0 is the salient and obvious candidate 
for a non-strategic level-0 choice, because it awards the highest “sure payoff” of 
A
0
= 20 that can be obtained without any strategic considerations. Thus, the right-
most box 0 is a natural anchor serving as the starting point for level-k reasoning.10 
If the bonus R is large enough, that is, R > 20 − min{A
b
|b = 1,… 9} , then the path 
of reasoning for the level-k model with starting point s∗
0






= k for 
k = 1,… , 9.11 In other words, for a sufficiently large bonus the best reply is always 
to choose the box that is exactly one to the left of your opponent (if there is such a 
box). In particular, the path of reasoning is independent of the specific payoff struc-
ture, as long as the bonus is sufficiently large and the right-most box is a salient 
anchor.
We use two main variants of the 11–20 game. In the baseline versions (BASE) 
the amounts are increasing from the left box to the rightmost box, which con-








= 20 . In BASE 
there is a natural trade-off between the sure payoffs A0,… , A9 and the bonus, 
because with each incremental step of reasoning a player gives up some sure pay-
off. We designed the flat-cost versions (FLAT) in order to remove this trade-off. 
For FLAT the first iteration results in giving up a fixed amount of sure payoff, but 









= 20 . Thus, choosing any box except the rightmost gives 
the same sure payoff and, hence, after the first step there is no additional trade-off 
between sure payoff and bonus.
For each main variant we used two versions with the same structure but differ-
ing in sure payoffs. Those treatments were designed to vary the magnitude of the 
trade-off between sure payoff and conducting additional steps of reasoning. Spe-
cifically, there is a “small increment” (SI) and a “large increment” (LI) version of 
BASE and FLAT (see Fig. 1), denoted by BASESI , BASELI , FLATSI , and FLATLI , 
respectively.12 For BASESI the sure amounts range from 11 to 20 in increments of 
1, whereas for BASELI they range from 2 to 20 in increments of 2. For FLATSI all 
amounts other than 20 were set to 17, whereas for FLATLI they were set to 14. That 
is, for both large increment versions the trade-off between bonus R and sure payoff 
for an additional step of reasoning is increased, although for FLAT the increase is 
only strict for the first step. BASESI corresponds to the original version of Arad and 
10 In Online Appendix B we discuss the robustness of our results with respect to different level-0 specifi-
cations including the common assumption of uniform randomization.
11 The best reply to box 9 is to choose box 0, hence for k > 9 the best-reply structure cycles repeatedly 
from 0 to 9. That is, theoretically a choice of box k could also result from k + 10 (or generally k + 10n ) 
steps. To solve this issue, Alaoui and Penta (2016a) propose a modified 11–20 game that breaks this best-
reply cycle. The observed distribution of play, however, is very similar to the one in Rubinstein’s original 
11–20 game (exhibiting the best-reply cycle). This is not surprising, because existing evidence in the lit-
erature documents that 10 and more steps of reasoning are highly uncommon. Thus, focusing on the first 
9 steps only is likely to be inconsequential.
12 For all versions there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. For example, for 
BASESI and FLATSI with a bonus of R = 20 those are given by 
(
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Rubinstein (2012), and the FLAT variants could also be viewed as a modification of 
the costless-iterations version there. Although the sure payoffs given by A0,… , A9 
differ across versions, the best-reply structure is the same for all versions, with k 
steps of reasoning corresponding to a choice of box k.
To study the effect of value of reasoning, we added an additional dimension that 
systematically varies the incentives to reason without altering the path of reason-
ing, the bonus R. Specifically, we used two different bonus levels for each of the 
four versions depicted in Fig.  1. In the high-bonus condition, subjects obtained 
R = 40 additional points for the “correct” box, while in the low-bonus condition 
they received R = 20 additional points. Thus there are four games of the BASE type 






= k for 
k = 1,… , 9 induced by the standard level-k model, Table 1 gives the value of rea-
soning for all eight 11–20 games.
4.3  Design and procedures
A total of 128 subjects (79 female) participated in 4 experimental sessions with 32 
subjects each. Participants were recruited from the student population of the Uni-
versity of Cologne using ORSEE (Greiner 2015), excluding students of psychology, 
economics, and economics-related fields, as well as experienced subjects who had 
already participated in more than 10 experiments. The experiment was conducted 
at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER) and was programmed in 
z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
The experiment consisted of three parts during which subjects could earn points. 
First, each subject played a series of different versions of the money request game. 
Both treatments, BASE and FLAT, were played four times each, once for each 
bonus-increment combination. Second, subjects participated in a single beauty 
contest game with p = (2∕3) . In the third part we collected correlates of cognitive 
A9 A8 A7 A6 A5 A4 A3 A2 A1 2011-20 game
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0Level
BASESI 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
BASELI 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
FLATSI 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 20
FLATLI 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 20
Fig. 1  Representation of the generalized 11–20 game and associated levels of reasoning (top), and of the 
different variants (bottom): BASE with small (BASESI ) and large increments (BASELI ). FLAT with small 
(FLATSI ) and large increments (FLATLI)
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ability and other individual characteristics. There was no feedback during the course 
of the experiment, that is, subjects did not learn the choices of their opponents nor 
did they get any information regarding their earnings until the very end of the exper-
iment. All decisions were made independently and at a subject’s individual pace. In 
particular, subjects never had to wait for the decisions of another subject except for 
the very end of the experiment (when all their decision had already been collected). 
At that point they had to wait until everybody had completed the experiment so that 
outcomes and payoffs could be realized.
We now describe each part of the experiment in detail. For the 11–20 games, we 
randomly assigned the subjects within a session to one of four randomized sequences 
of the games to control for order effects.13 Subjects were randomly matched with a 
new opponent for every game to determine their payoff for that round, hence pre-
serving the one-shot character of the interaction. The variants BASE and FLAT 
were played exactly four times each, once for each possible combination of incre-
ment (small/large) and bonus (low/high).
In the second part, subjects played a single beauty contest game with p = 2∕3 
among all 32 session participants. The winner, that is, the subject whose guess was 
closest to 2/3 times the average of all choices, received 500 points (split equally in 
case of ties).
In the final part of the experiment, participants answered a series of questions. 
First, subjects completed an extended 7-item version of the CRT from Toplak et al. 
(2014), which includes the three classical items from Frederick (2005).14 Subjects 
received 5 points for each correct answer. We also elicited aversion to strategic 
uncertainty using the method by Heinemann et  al. (2009) with random groups of 
four. To control for differences in mechanical swiftness (Cappelen et al. 2013), we 
recorded the time needed to complete four simple demographic questions on gender, 
age, field of study, and native language.
To determine a subject’s earnings in the experiment the payoffs from each part 
were added up and converted into euros at a rate of €0.25 for each 10 points (around 
$0.28 at the time of the experiment). In addition subjects received a show-up fee of 
€4 ($4.49) for an average total remuneration of €15.67 ($17.59). A session lasted on 
average 60 minutes including instructions and payment.15
15 The translated instructions can be found in Online Appendix D.
13 The sequences are provided in the supplementary material (see Online Appendix C). Besides the two 
main treatments, BASE and FLAT, discussed here, the sequences contained two additional treatments 
discussed in the Appendix.
14 Subjects also answered the two additional items of Primi et al. (2016), but our results do not change 
if we use their extended CRT or a combination of both instead. Other studies (Cappelen et  al. 2013; 
Gill and Prowse 2016) have also used the Raven test as a proxy for cognitive ability. Brañas-Garza et al. 
(2012) used the Raven test and the CRT by Frederick (2005) in a series of six one-shot beauty contest 
games and found that CRT predicted higher-level choices, while performance in the Raven test did not.
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5  Depth of reasoning in the beauty contest
We first analyze behavior and deliberation times in the beauty contest game. The left 
panel of Fig. 2 depicts the distribution of choices in this game. Of the 128 subjects 
only two subjects chose a Nash Equilibrium strategy,16 38 chose a number close to 
33 (level-1), 12 chose a number close to 22 (level-2), 11 chose a number close to 15 
(level-3), and 7 subjects chose a number corresponding to higher levels. The target 
numbers in our four sessions were 27, 28, 29 and 32 and the respective winning 
numbers were 28, 27, 30 and 32. Hence, the best-performing strategy (among the 
level-k strategies) would have been the level-1 choice of 33. We categorized each 
player’s choice in terms of the nearest level (Coricelli and Nagel 2009) as follows.17 
We calculated the quadratic distance between the actual choice x and each level-
k choice, that is, (x − 50(2∕3)k)2 . A choice x was then classified as level-k if this 
quadratic distance was minimal for k.18 Given this classification, the average of all 
guesses by level-0 players is 65.36. Overall behavior is in line with previous results 
in the literature, that commonly observe mostly one to three steps of reasoning and 
a significant amount of unclassified (random) choices, usually thought of as level-0.
We measured the CRT as a proxy for cognitive ability. The score in the CRT 
shows a high degree of individual heterogeneity with some subjects answering no 
answer correctly, some answering all 7 answers correctly, and the rest answering 
between 1 and 6 answers correctly. Specifically, the number of subjects who gave 0, 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 correct answers was 8, 18, 13, 13, 18, 16, 24, and 18, respec-
tively. On average subjects answered 3.95 of the 7 answers correctly with a median 
Table 1  Value of reasoning v(k) 
for the different variants
k
Bonus 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
BASESI Low 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
High 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
BASELI Low 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
High 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
FLATSI Low 17 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
High 37 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
FLATLI Low 14 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
High 34 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
16 The low number of subjects choosing a Nash strategy is comparable to observations in previous 
experiments (e.g. Nagel 1995; Brañas-Garza et  al. 2012; Allred et  al. 2016). However, in our case it 
might be less surprising as we excluded students majoring in economics.
17 Our results are robust to alternative classifications, for example when only the level-k strategy ± 1 or 
± 2 are classified as level-k.
18 Two subjects chose the Nash equilibrium strategy 0 with a very short deliberation time. Strictly speak-
ing these choices cannot be attributed to any finite level and, hence, were excluded from the analysis. Our 
results are robust when those choices are included and classified as level-0 or level-6.
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of 4 correct answers. Cognitive ability was previously found to be correlated with 
level in the beauty contest (Brañas-Garza et al. 2012). To check for this relation in 
our data we conducted a Tobit regression with level as dependent variable that con-
trols for high cognitive ability. The results of this regression are reported in Table 2 
(model 1). We find a significant and positive effect of cognitive ability on the level 
of reasoning.19 This indicates that subjects with higher cognitive ability (as meas-
ured by their CRT score) tend to make higher-level guesses in the beauty contest 
game, which confirms previous results in the literature.
Next, we turn to deliberation times. The right panel of Fig. 2 shows a scatter plot 
of subjects’ guesses and the corresponding time taken for that choice. The slope of 
the regression line suggests a negative correlation between deliberation times and 
“higher-level” choices. That is, choices corresponding to more steps of reasoning 
required longer deliberation times. This observation is consistent with Prediction 2, 
that is, deliberation time is longer for choices that require more steps of reasoning. 
We now test this prediction using a series of four linear regressions with deliberation 
times (DT) as dependent variable.
The regression results are presented in Table 2 (model 2–5). We find a significant 
positive effect of higher-level choices on deliberation time (model 2). That is, in line 
with Prediction  2, deliberation time is increasing in the depth of reasoning. This 
result remains robust when we control for cognitive ability (model 3), measured by 
the score in the extended CRT (median split), and when we add additional controls 
(model 4). Further, cognitive ability in itself has no significant effect on deliberation 
times. Recall that we found more steps of reasoning for subjects with higher cogni-
tive ability, which should lead to longer deliberation times. At the same time higher 
cognitive ability may decrease per-step deliberation times. To check for the latter 
effect, we included the interaction term between level and high CRT (model 5). The 
interaction shows a marginally significant positive effect indicating a stronger cor-
relation between level and deliberation times for subjects with higher cognitive abil-
ity. In contrast, for a low CRT score the coefficient of level becomes insignificant, 
which would be in line with the interpretation of some of those subjects choosing 
randomly. That is, although some of these choices are (wrongly) classified as higher 
levels, they are not the result of more thorough deliberation and, hence, show no 
correlation with deliberation times.
6  Depth of reasoning in the 11–20 games
Choices in BASE closely resemble the behavioral patterns found in Arad and Rubin-
stein (2012) and Goeree et al. (2018), with most subjects selecting one of the three 
rightmost boxes corresponding to levels 0–3 (see Fig. A.1, Online Appendix). 
19 Throughout the paper the standard variables for regressions are defined as follows: HighCRT (dummy 
taking value 1 if number of correct answers is at least 4), gender (dummy), strategic uncertainty (0–10, 







) where T i
swift
 is the time needed 
by subject i to answer 4 demographic questions).
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Behavior in FLAT is similar, with most choices corresponding to no more than three 
steps of reasoning. Compared to BASE, however, in FLAT there is a larger fraction 
of level-0 choices, which is consistent with our assumptions, since the value of rea-
soning for that step is lower.20
We now turn to the analysis of deliberation times. In this and all following regres-
sions we include controls for cognitive ability (HighCRT), gender, attitude toward 
strategic uncertainty, mechanical swiftness, and the position within the sequence of 
games (Period).21
We run separate regressions for the game variants BASE and FLAT considering 
only the four choices taken for each of the variants. Table 3 presents the results of 
these regressions. There is a significant and positive relation between deliberation 
times and depth of reasoning for both BASE (model 1) and FLAT (model 4). That 
is, in line with Prediction 2, choices associated with more steps of thinking require 
more deliberation. Next, we note that (in all variants) a choice of the rightmost box 
is appealing because it maximizes the sure payoff (20) and because it minimizes 
strategic uncertainty, as it yields a guaranteed payoff independently of the choice of 
the other player. This makes it a salient level-0 strategy (see Online Appendix B for 
a discussion of alternative level-0 specifications). Hence, choices of the rightmost 
box might be particularly fast, creating a confound. That is, even if there is no rela-
tion between the imputed level of reasoning and deliberation times, if choosing the 
rightmost box is particularly fast, the regressions might show a non-existing trend. 
To check for this, we include a dummy indicating those choices, denoted Level-0. 
There is no evidence that level-0 choices are generally faster. For BASE, level-0 
choices are even slower than other choices, whereas for FLAT they show a non-
significant tendency to be faster. Subjects with an above-median CRT score (dummy 
HighCRT) do not take significantly longer to make their decisions (we remind the 
reader that, without further assumptions, the overall effect of cognitive ability on 
deliberation times is indeterminate; recall Sect. 3.2). In a next step, we include the 
interaction between high cognitive ability and level (models 2 and 5). In BASE, the 
interaction term is positive and significant, that is, for cognitively more able sub-
jects the increase in deliberation time per step is larger. In contrast, for FLAT there 
is an overall effect of level (linear combination test Level + HighCRT  ×  Level: 
 = 0.7048 , p = 0.043 ) but no significant difference between high and low cogni-
tive ability. A possible reason for the difference with BASE is that, in FLAT, the 
sure payoffs are constant after the first step. However, the lack of significance for the 
interaction term might simply reflect that more observations are concentrated on the 
lower levels for FLAT, compared to BASE.
Arguably, there are many individual level variables that may be correlated 
with deliberation times, hence creating potential confounds. In particular, some 
20 When playing against the empirical distribution of choices, the best-performing strategies for BASE 
and FLAT would correspond to level 2 and level 1, respectively. Controlling for empirical payoffs does 
not affect our results.
21 Variables are defined as follows: Level-0 (dummy); Level (0–9; a choice of box k is classified as level 
k); Period (1–16; controls for position in the sequence of games).
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individuals might be faster or slower than others for a variety of reasons. A Spear-
man correlation between subject’s average deliberation time in BASE and FLAT 
confirms that subjects who are faster in one variant also tend to be faster in the 
other ( N = 128 ,  = 0.4769 , p < 0.0001 ). To account for such individual differ-
ences we ran additional regressions using subject fixed effects (models 3 and 6).22 
Table 2  Regressions for the beauty contest game
Standard errors in parentheses. Omitted controls are gender, strategic uncertainty, and swiftness
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Tobit on level (1) Linear regression on DT (2–5)
1 2 3 4 5
Level 4.9964*** 4.6657*** 4.4997*** 1.3659
(1.0557) (1.0905) (1.1113) (2.0823)
HighCRT 0.6604*** 3.2239 2.3319 -0.9425
(0.2018) (2.7270) (2.8958) (3.4128)
Level × HighCRT 4.3063*
(2.4282)
Constant 1.4672*** 17.9288*** 16.3634*** 14.8148* 17.7601**
(0.5306) (1.6692) (2.1285) (7.5441) (7.6598)
Controls Yes No No Yes Yes
Pseudo/adjusted R2 0.0316 0.1462 0.1489 0.1461 0.1611
F-test 4.4864*** 22.4003*** 11.9349*** 5.2784*** 5.0015***









































Fig. 2  Choices and deliberation times in the beauty contest game. Left panel: histogram of guesses 
(0–100). Right panel: scatter plot of guesses (0–100) versus deliberation time for that guess (in s) and 
linear regression with 95% confidence interval
22 Note that fixed effects regressions cannot include controls that are constant on the subject level. Con-
sequently, HighCRT, gender, strategic uncertainty, and swiftness cannot be included in these regressions.
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The results are qualitatively unchanged, indicating that our results are robust to 
individual differences in deliberation times.
In summary, we find generally longer deliberation times for higher-level choices 
in both variants, which is in line with Prediction 2. In BASE, cognitively more able 
subjects tend to require more additional time per step, which is not the case in FLAT. 
This might be due to the comparably low value of reasoning associated with the first 
step in FLAT, which results in a large fraction of subjects choosing the rightmost 
box and only few choices corresponding to more than two steps of reasoning.
7  Value of reasoning in the 11–20 game
In this section we examine the effect of changes in the incentives, and thus the 
value of reasoning, on both choices and deliberation times in the 11–20 game. 
For this purpose, we make use of the fact that for each 11–20 game variant we 
also varied the payoff structure along two incentive dimensions, the size of the 
increment in sure payoff and the bonus that could be received.
Table 3  Panel regressions of DT on level for the 11–20 games
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models are restricted to subsamples including only the four deci-
sions in BASE or FLAT, respectively. Omitted controls are gender, strategic uncertainty, and swiftness




Random effects Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects
DT 1 2 3 4 5 6
Level-0 2.3407** 2.3545** 3.0053** − 0.9022 − 0.9049 − 0.7443
(1.0238) (1.0189) (1.2810) (0.9223) (0.9218) (1.0645)
Level 0.6636** 0.1106 0.3577 0.6160** 0.5058 1.2086*
(0.3365) (0.3466) (0.4426) (0.3014) (0.4174) (0.6307)
HighCRT − 0.0027 − 2.0318* 1.3446 1.0410
(0.9039) (1.0994) (0.9632) (1.0605)
High-
CRT × Level
1.2499** 1.3158** 0.1990 − 0.4939
(0.5897) (0.6095) (0.4769) (0.6581)
Period − 0.9139*** − 0.9001*** − 0.8878*** − 1.0473*** − 1.0484*** − 1.0386***
(0.0673) (0.0685) (0.0680) (0.0818) (0.0817) (0.0804)
Constant 18.6860*** 19.2368*** 15.1104*** 19.2446*** 19.4665*** 17.5967***
(2.3163) (2.2880) (0.8965) (3.6437) (3.6855) (1.0129)
Controls Yes Yes – Yes Yes –
R
2 (overall) 0.2966 0.3083 0.2743 0.3131 0.3146 0.2773
Observations 512 512 512 512 512 512
Subjects 128 128 128 128 128 128
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7.1  Incentives and choices
A higher bonus increases the value of reasoning, v(k), by 20 for each step.23 Hence, 
according to Prediction 1, we would expect the observed level to be weakly higher 
for a high bonus compared to a low bonus for all treatments. This is indeed the 
case for both variants, BASE and FLAT. In BASE, the average level is 1.7148 for 
the high bonus versions, larger than the average of 1.5078 for a low bonus (WSR, 
N = 128 , z = 2.915 , p = 0.0036 ). In FLAT, the average level is 1.5820 for the high 
bonus versions, again larger than the average of 1.4648 for the low bonus versions 
(WSR, N = 128 , z = 2.713 , p = 0.0067 ). Hence, Prediction 1 is confirmed.
Conversely, large increments decrease the value of reasoning for all steps in 
BASE and for the first step in FLAT, hence one should expect weakly lower lev-
els in these variants. Indeed, and again in line with Prediction 1, we do find lower 
average levels for large increments compared to small increments for both variants. 
The difference is significant for FLAT (large increment, average level 1.2773; small 
increment, 1.7695; WSR N = 128 , z = − 4.367 , p < 0.0001 ) but fails to reach sig-
nificance for BASE (large increment, average level 1.5000; small increment, 1.7227; 
WSR, N = 128 , z = − 1.613 , p = 0.1068).
In summary, the changes in the average depth of reasoning resulting from our 
systematic changes in the value of reasoning are in line with Prediction 1. To further 
examine this conclusion while controlling for individual differences, we turn to a 
regression analysis. Table 4 shows the results of two random-effects Tobit regres-
sions with level as dependent variable, one for each game variant, using the size of 
the bonus and the size of the increment as regressors. The regressions confirm that 
large increments led to less steps of reasoning in both variants (significantly nega-
tive coefficients for the large increment dummies). Regarding bonus, in BASE there 
is a significant and positive effect of bonus, with more high-level choices when the 
bonus is high, confirming again the observation above. Contrary to the conclusion 
from the nonparametric test, in FLAT we find no effect of high bonus on level. In 
this game variant, however, there is a high concentration of choices on levels 0 and 
1 (over 60%), which may explain the absence of an effect of bonus on level. Hence, 
we ran an additional random-effects probit regression on a binary variable that takes 
the value 1 if level is larger or equal to 1 and 0 otherwise (see Table A.2). A posi-
tive effect of bonus on this binary variable would indicate that increasing the bonus 
leads to more choices corresponding to at least one step of reasoning. Indeed, we 
find a significant positive effect of bonus on this binary variable ( N(Obs) = 512 , 
N(Subj) = 128 ,  = 0.4008 , p = 0.0054).
7.2  Incentives and deliberation times
We now analyze the effect of a change in the incentives on deliberation times. 
Tables 5 and 6 show the results of a series of panel regressions of DT on level for 
23 Recall that we focus only on the first nine steps. For those, the increase is exactly 20.
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BASE and FLAT, respectively, where DT refers to the total deliberation time. The 
crucial variables are the dummies for the high bonus and large increment conditions, 
as well as the interactions of level with those. The regressions examine the effects of 
bonus and increment simultaneously for each game type, but for expositional clarity 
we discuss them in two separate subsections.
7.2.1  Effect of the bonus
Increasing the bonus has a twofold effect on total deliberation times: First, it 
increases the potential gain from an additional step of reasoning by 20 and thus 
increases the value of reasoning for the first nine steps. In the previous subsection, 
we have seen that, in line with Prediction 1, an increase in the bonus leads to an 
increase in the number of steps of reasoning. If the time functions k
i
 are constant in 
value of reasoning, by Prediction 3 the total deliberation time per decision should 
increase. In contrast, if the time functions are decreasing in value of reasoning, 
according to Prediction  4 deliberation times per step should be shorter when the 
bonus is high. As a consequence, the aggregate effect on total deliberation times 
is indeterminate. To disentangle these two effects, the regression Tables  5 and 6 
include models controlling for the size of the bonus and the interaction of level with 
bonus.
For the BASE variants (Table  5), we find shorter deliberation times when the 
bonus is high (model 1). This effect remains when we control for level (model 2). 
This is in direct contradiction with Prediction  3, but is compatible with Predic-
tion 4. In terms of the latter, it indicates that the direct effect (shorter deliberation 
times per step) dominates the indirect one (increased deliberation time through 
increased number of steps). To check whether the increase in deliberation time per 
level is indeed affected by the bonus, we include the interaction of level with high 
bonus (model 3). The coefficient for the latter is negative and marginally significant 
( p = 0.058 ), that is, when the bonus is high subjects require less additional delibera-
tion time per step, confirming Prediction 4. The coefficient of HighBonus becomes 
small and insignificant indicating that deliberation times for level-0 choices do not 
respond to the increased bonus. These results are in line with decreasing time func-
tions k
i
 . In particular, they are incompatible with constant deliberation times per 
step, since then the model would predict (weakly) higher overall deliberation times 
(Prediction 3) and no interaction effect of level and bonus. As a robustness check we 
also estimated the same specification (model 3) with subject fixed effects instead of 
random effects. This allows us to identify the effects from within-subject variation, 
hence is robust to confounds such as differences in cognitive ability. Comparing this 
estimation (model 5) with the random effects specification (model 3) shows that the 
results are qualitatively unchanged.
For the FLAT variants (Table  6), subjects overall deliberate longer in the high 
bonus condition (model 1). This effect remains when we control for level in model 
2. Further, it stays significant when we additionally control for the interaction of 
level with bonus (model 3). Unlike in BASE, the coefficient of the interaction of 
level and bonus is not significant. Again a robustness check using a fixed effects 
regression (model 5) yields similar results.
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Summarizing, we find that increasing the bonus decreases deliberation times in 
BASE (suggesting that level-k reasoning is salient) and increases deliberation times 
in FLAT. The decrease in BASE is a result of shorter deliberation times per step, 
in line with Prediction  4, which explains why overall deliberation time decreases 
although observed levels are higher. We note that this result is incompatible with 
Prediction 3 and the assumption that deliberation time per step is independent of the 
value of reasoning of that step.
7.2.2  Effect of the increment
The predicted effect of an increase in the increment depends on the specifics of the 
underlying payoff structure and hence differs across treatments. In BASE, large 
increments again have a twofold effect. First, the value of reasoning decreases by 
1 for the first nine steps. Hence, according to Prediction 4 we would expect longer 
deliberation times per step for large increments. However, the decrease in incentives 
is very small compared to the one resulting from a change in the bonus, and hence 
this effect is likely to be small as well. On the other hand, because large increments 
imply a lower value of reasoning, subjects potentially conduct less steps of reasoning 
(again assuming that cognitive costs are unaffected), which in turn should decrease 
overall deliberation time. Hence, the overall effect is undetermined. The results for 
BASE (Table  5) show a small but marginally significant effect indicating slightly 
shorter deliberation times for large increments, and no significant interaction effect. 
The corresponding fixed effects regression (model 6) yields the same conclusion.
In FLAT, only the value of reasoning for the first step is lower for large incre-
ments, while the value for the remaining steps is unaffected. Hence, we expect 
Table 4  Random effects 
Tobit regressions of level 
with controls for bonus and 
increment
Standard errors in parentheses. Models are restricted to subsamples 
including only the four decisions in BASE and FLAT, respectively. 
Omitted controls are gender, strategic uncertainty, and swiftness
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longer deliberation times for the first step. Again, a smaller value of reasoning for the 
first step might lead subjects to conduct less steps of reasoning, which in turn might 
decrease overall deliberation time. The results for this game variant (Table 6) indi-
cate longer deliberation times (model 1) for large increments, although the effect on 
the depth of reasoning is negative. As in the case of bonus, within the model this can 
be explained by a change in the time required for each step of reasoning. To test for 
this change, we additionally control for the interaction of level with large increment 
(model 4). The coefficient for the latter is not significant. The reason for this might 
be that for large increments the value of reasoning only changes for the first step 
compared to small increments. Indeed, in a restricted regression that only considers 
levels 0 and 1 (see Table A.3), we find a significant and positive interaction effect of 
level with large increment (  = 2.963 , p = 0.077 ), in line with Prediction 4. That is, 
deliberation times for the first step are higher for large increment, which explains the 
overall increase in deliberation time in FLAT. These results again show support for 
the deliberation times per step being decreasing in the value of reasoning.
Table 5  Panel regressions of DT with bonus and increment for BASE
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models are restricted to subsamples including only the four deci-
sions in BASE. Omitted controls are cognitive ability, gender, strategic uncertainty, and swiftness
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Regression 
type
Random effects (1–4) Fixed effects (5–6)
DT 1 2 3 4 5 6
HighBonus − 2.4360*** − 2.3906*** − 0.7611 − 2.3894*** − 1.5304 − 2.4152***
(0.5471) (0.5572) (0.9219) (0.6074) (0.9287) (0.6410)
LargeIncr − 0.8567* − 0.8002* − 0.7937 − 0.4815 − 0.6992 − 0.8747
(0.4824) (0.4800) (0.4829) (0.8726) (0.4761) (0.8623)
Level− 0 1.9532** 2.2250** 1.8923* 2.6233*
(0.9858) (0.9996) (1.0586) (1.4590)
Level 0.6618** 1.1880** 0.7319* 1.0770** 1.0630***









Period − 0.9635*** − 0.9337*** − 0.9290*** − 0.9365*** − 0.9444*** − 0.9177***
(0.0684) (0.0658) (0.0657) (0.0756) (0.0665) (0.0771)
Constant 22.7455*** 20.5488*** 19.4259*** 20.4702*** 17.8878*** 17.0927***
(2.1656) (2.3349) (2.4946) (2.5907) (1.0073) (1.2028)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes – –
R
2 (overall) 0.3125 0.3180 0.3297 0.3191 0.3035 0.2975
Observations 512 512 512 512 512 512
Subjects 128 128 128 128 128 128
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Summarizing, for the large increment condition we find overall longer deliberation 
times in FLAT, but not in BASE. The increase in FLAT is a result of longer delib-
eration times for the first step, confirming Prediction 4. These results are compatible 
with deliberation times per step being decreasing in the value of reasoning. That is, the 
model can explain why deliberation times in FLAT are increasing for large increment 
although observed choices correspond to less steps of reasoning. Again, we want to 
stress that this effect would be incompatible with a model where the deliberation time 
per step is constant, since in this case less steps of reasoning can only decrease overall 
deliberation times, but never increase them (Prediction 3).
Table 6  Panel regressions of DT with bonus and increment for FLAT
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models are restricted to subsamples including only the four deci-
sions in FLAT. Omitted controls are cognitive ability, gender, strategic uncertainty, and swiftness
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Regression 
type
Random effects Fixed effects
DT 1 2 3 4 5 6
HighBonus 1.8751*** 1.7104*** 1.7831*** 1.6925*** 1.7672*** 1.6709***
(0.5162) (0.5060) (0.6475) (0.6035) (0.6150) (0.5889)
LargeIncr 1.9468*** 2.4313*** 2.4341*** 1.8201** 2.5028*** 2.1510**
(0.6786) (0.6951) (0.6968) (0.8862) (0.6999) (1.0241)
Level-0 − 1.0307 − 1.0283 − 0.8603 − 0.8267
(0.9353) (0.9385) (0.9790) (1.2328)
Level 0.7025** 0.7243** 0.5554 1.1722*** 0.9430*









Period − 1.0707*** − 1.0525*** − 1.0525*** − 1.0469*** − 1.0508*** − 1.0432***
(0.0830) (0.0797) (0.0798) (0.0848) (0.0786) (0.0904)
Constant 18.8567*** 17.0316*** 16.9980*** 17.2688*** 14.9359*** 15.5395***
(3.3540) (3.4757) (3.4870) (3.6448) (0.7200) (1.1244)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes – –
R
2 (overall) 0.3173 0.3366 0.3367 0.3389 0.3080 0.3111
Observations 512 512 512 512 512 512
Subjects 128 128 128 128 128 128
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8  Discussion
In this work, we have tested a simple model linking depth of reasoning (as revealed 
by choices), incentives, and deliberation times. The total deliberation time of an 
observed choice is modeled as the sum of the deliberation times resulting from a 
sequence of steps of reasoning. This model provides empirically testable predic-
tions regarding the relation of deliberation times, depth of reasoning as revealed by 
choices, and incentives. An immediate prediction is that higher observed depth of 
reasoning implies longer deliberation times. The model also implies that increasing 
the value of reasoning (the incentives to make an additional step) will lead to more 
steps of reasoning. However, this would only imply that increasing incentives results 
in longer deliberation times if we assumed that the deliberation time for a given step 
is independent of the value of reasoning in that step. This, however, is in contradic-
tion with the well-established closeness-to-indifference effect. This effect would pre-
scribe that deliberation time for a given step is a decreasing function of the value of 
reasoning of that step. This property in turn implies that, for a fixed number of steps 
of thinking, higher incentives result in faster decisions.
We test the predictions of the model using experimental data. Both in the beauty 
contest and in the 11–20 money request game, choices attributed to more steps of 
reasoning lead to longer deliberation times. In this way, this work shows that delib-
eration times provide direct evidence on the link between heterogeneity in cognitive 
effort and behavioral heterogeneity (in the level-k sense). We also show that cogni-
tive depth reacts to monetary incentives. Increasing the value of reasoning leads to 
more steps of reasoning which are implemented in a shorter total deliberation time. 
This is incompatible with deliberation times per step being independent of value of 
reasoning, but in agreement with a decreasing relation.
In this study, we have abstracted from a number of possible difficulties, as e.g. 
possible non-monotonicities in the relation between incentives and effort. Another 
important one is that depth of reasoning is not uniquely the result of cognitive effort 
or ability, but also endogenously depends on the subjects’ beliefs about others. In 
other words, increasing incentives need not result in added steps of reasoning if the 
player does not believe that the opponent will also react to incentives. However, if 
the value of reasoning increases for both players (as e.g. in our low vs. high bonus 
comparisons) the maximum number of steps a player is willing or able to do should 
always weakly increase. Although we did not measure or manipulate beliefs in our 
experiment, Alaoui and Penta (2016a) have shown empirically that observed levels 
react to manipulations in subjects’ beliefs in the expected way.
In conclusion, we show that deliberation times are a direct measure of cognitive 
effort which can be used to study the link between heterogeneity in observed eco-
nomic choices and imputed differences in cognitive depth. This simple expansion of 
the economist’s toolbox is a first step toward a more complete account of the deter-
minants of behavioral heterogeneity.
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Appendix: Other Variants of the 11–20 game
The experiment included two additional variations of the 11–20 game, depicted in 
Fig. 3, and we report the results of those treatments here.
An “Extreme” variant
One additional treatment was an extreme version (EXTR) of the 11–20 game, previ-
ously used in Goeree et al. (2018). We use this variant because reconciling empir-
ically-observed choices with iterative thinking requires inordinately high levels of 
depth of reasoning, compared to those usually observed in the literature. This pro-
vides a natural setting where deliberation times can discriminate whether observed 
behavior actually corresponds to different levels of cognitive effort, and thus mod-
eling behavior via iterative thinking is justified.
Specifically, in this version, all amounts except for the highest one are rearranged 
to be decreasing from left to right with the second-highest amount in the leftmost 
box. Since the rightmost box still contains the highest amount of 20, this does not 
alter the underlying best-reply structure, hence the path of reasoning is the same as 
in BASE and FLAT. However, it crucially affects the sure payoff associated with 
different levels of reasoning. Choosing box 1 now offers a disproportionately low 
sure payoff, and further steps increase the sure payoff. Moreover, this asymmetry 
potentially opens the door for alternative models of decision making or even heuris-
tic behavior, such as choosing the highest amount that still grants the possibility of a 
bonus, which in this case means choosing the leftmost box. As in other variants, we 
used versions with small and large increments. Those are illustrated in Fig. 3 (upper 
part), and Table 7 (upper part) presents the value of reasoning for this variant.
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Results
Behavior in EXTR is comparable to that observed in Goeree et al. (2018), and vastly 
different from that observed in BASE and FLAT (see Fig. A.2, Online Appendix). A 
large fraction of subjects (between 38 and 62%) chose the rightmost box containing 
the salient amount of 20, but boxes 1 and 2 to its left were chosen very rarely com-
pared to BASE and FLAT. Instead, between 25 and 33% of subjects chose one of the 
two leftmost boxes, 8 and 9, which were almost never chosen in BASE and FLAT. 
Interpreting behavior according to level-k reasoning, these choices correspond 
to eight or nine steps of reasoning, which seems implausible (Goeree et al. 2018). 
Using deliberation times as a measure for cognitive effort, however, will allow us to 
directly test this hypothesis.
We note that choices in EXTR generally required longer deliberation times (aver-
age 12.61  s) compared to BASE (average 9.93  s; Wilcoxon Signed Rank (WSR) 
test, N = 128 , z = 4.678 , p < 0.0001 ) and FLAT (average 9.92  s, WSR, N = 128 , 
z = 4.375 , p < 0.0001 ). Table 8 reports the results of a series of regressions consid-
ering only the four choices in EXTR. We observe very fast level-0 choices, and no 
further relation between deliberation times and level. Subjects with an above-median 
EXTRSI 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 20
EXTRLI 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 20
SOCPSI 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 20 20
SOCPLI 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 20 20
Fig. 3  Representation of the different variations: EXTR and SOCP with small and large increments 
(EXTRSI , EXTRLI , SOCPSI , and SOCPLI)
Table 7  Value of reasoning 
v(k) for the different variants of 
EXTR and SOCP
k
Bonus 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
EXTRSI Low 11 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
High 31 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41
EXTRLI Low 2 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
High 22 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
SOCPSI Low 20 17 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
High 40 37 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
SOCPLI Low 20 14 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
High 40 34 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
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CRT score require significantly longer for their decisions. In a next step, we include 
the interaction term between high CRT and level, which is positive and significant. 
However, a robustness check using subject fixed effects finds no significant interac-
tion and even a marginally significant negative correlation between level and delib-
eration times. In summary, we find that level-0 choices are significantly faster, but 
there is no evidence of a relation between imputed depth of reasoning and delibera-
tion times for higher-level choices. This result strongly suggests that subjects do not 
rely on iterative reasoning to the same extent as in BASE although the game variant 
features the same path of reasoning. A natural explanation is that even though the 
path of reasoning is identical, the actual payoffs make other features of the game 
salient, rendering iterative thinking less appropriate in this case.
Effect of incentives in EXTR
We now consider the effects of changes in the incentives, hence the value of reason-
ing. A high bonus increases the value of reasoning by 20 for all steps also in EXTR. 
However, there is no significant difference in the observed level between the high 
bonus versions (average level 3.3047) and the low bonus ones (average 3.1248; WSR, 
N = 128 , z = 0.942 , p = 0.3461 ), again casting doubt on whether decisions arise 
from iterative thinking in EXTR. Note that large increments sharply lower v(1) in 
EXTR, but all other values v(2),… , v(9) increase (slightly). Hence, the overall effect 
Table 8  Panel regressions of DT 
on level for EXTR
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models are restricted to sub-
samples including only the four decisions in EXTR. Omitted con-
trols are gender, strategic uncertainty, and swiftness
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Regression type Random effects Fixed effects
DT 1 2 3
Level-0 − 3.5491** − 3.5654** − 3.4489**
(1.4200) (1.4126) (1.6102)






Period − 1.0979*** − 1.0972*** − 1.1120***
(0.0954) (0.0957) (0.0960)
Constant 21.8656*** 22.5946*** 24.6701***
(4.4778) (4.4268) (1.7467)
Controls Yes Yes –
R
2 (overall) 0.2552 0.2609 0.2402
Observations 512 512 512
Subjects 128 128 128
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of large increments on level in EXTR is indeterminate. We do find lower average lev-
els for large increments compared to small increments (large increment, average level 
2.8164; small increment, 3.7031; WSR, N = 128 , z = − 3.145 , p = 0.0017).
Table 9 shows the results of a series of regressions for EXTR of DT on level. We 
find no evidence that bonus has any systematic effect on deliberation times. Turn-
ing to large increments, we note that the payoff structure in EXTR does not allow 
for a clear-cut prediction for the effect of large increments on deliberation times. 
The reason is that, as commented above, for large increments, the value of reason-
ing for the first step decreases sharply, but increases slightly for all further steps. 
As a consequence, we would expect longer deliberation times for the first step, and 
shorter deliberation times for all subsequent steps. It is unclear which of these coun-
tervailing effects should dominate. The regression results show significantly positive 
coefficients for large increments. However, we find no effect of level on delibera-
tion times and thus, perhaps not surprisingly, there is also no interaction effect with 
Table 9  Panel regressions of DT with bonus and increment for EXTR
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models are restricted to subsamples including only the four deci-
sions in EXTR. Omitted controls are gender, strategic uncertainty, and swiftness
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Regression 
type
Random effects (1–4) Fixed effects (5–6)
DT 1 2 3 4 5 6
HighBonus − 0.1299 − 0.4474 − 0.9983 − 0.4391 − 0.3600 − 0.4407
(0.6580) (0.6610) (0.7428) (0.7573) (0.7638) (0.7603)
LargeIncr 2.4486*** 3.0305*** 3.0437*** 2.5803*** 2.5716*** 2.3133**
(0.7163) (0.7561) (0.7563) (0.9639) (0.7200) (1.1461)
Level− 0 − 4.4830*** − 4.5773*** − 4.4259*** − 4.4969**
(1.4490) (1.4576) (1.4469) (1.9147)
Level − 0.1517 − 0.2439 − 0.2140 0.1141 − 0.3962









HighCRT 2.7586** 3.0864** 3.1064** 3.0831**
(1.3225) (1.3011) (1.3014) (1.3390)
Period − 1.1536*** − 1.1345*** − 1.1358*** − 1.1336*** − 1.1427*** − 1.1451***
(0.0911) (0.0912) (0.0911) (0.1014) (0.0914) (0.1049)
Constant 19.4076*** 21.4014*** 21.7837*** 21.6032*** 20.7245*** 24.6505***
(4.1835) (4.3673) (4.3839) (4.3270) (1.0593) (1.9662)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes – –
R
2 (overall) 0.2437 0.2743 0.2759 0.2744 0.2340 0.2443
Observations 512 512 512 512 512 512
Subjects 128 128 128 128 128 128
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increment. Analogous regressions with subject fixed effects yield the same conclu-
sion (models 5, 6). This effect is in contrast to the negative effect of large increments 
on the depth of reasoning, but unlike for BASE and FLAT this cannot be explained 
by a change in deliberation times per step.
EXTR as a caveat
The results for the EXTR variant suggest that the link between heterogeneity in cog-
nitive effort and behavioral heterogeneity that we illustrate in the main text is strong-
est when the payoff structure of the underlying game is such that iterative thinking 
is salient. However, for games where this is not the case, there is no clear relation 
between deliberation times and alleged depth of reasoning as imputed from choices 
only. For instance, in EXTR other features of the payoff structure are salient, and 
a more detailed examination of the effects of salience might be needed (e.g. Bor-
dalo et al. 2012, 2013). In these situations, cognitive depth should not be deduced 
exclusively from choices, and applying simple models of iterative thinking might be 
unwarranted. Our work hence also serves as a demonstration that deliberation times 
can be used as a tool to identify economic problems where features beyond the path 
of reasoning are crucial determinants of behavioral heterogeneity.
This caveat is related to a strand of literature that tries to better understand 
when iterative thinking describes actual decision processes and what cues trigger 
it. Ivanov et  al. (2009) show that level-k ceases to describe behavior well when 
the best-reply structure is complex and alternative plausible rules of thumb exist. 
Chong et al. (2016) show that incorporating a measure of salience to derive level-0 
behavior significantly improves model fit with respect to models where non-strategic 
agents randomize uniformly. Shapiro et al. (2014) show that the predictive power of 
the model can vary within a single game when different components of the payoff 
function are emphasized, with a better fit as the game becomes closer to a standard 
beauty contest and a worse fit as the pattern of levels of reasoning becomes less 
salient. This suggests that iterative thinking is one of many possible decision pro-
cesses players may employ, and which process ultimately determines the decision 
can depend on various features of the decision situation. Our results for the different 
variants of the 11–20 money request game confirm this view.
A “Social Preference” variant
The last, additional treatment was intended to test for an alternative explanation of 
the frequent “high-level” choices of the two leftmost boxes in EXTR, as previously 
observed by Goeree et  al. (2018). By choosing the leftmost box in EXTR a sub-
ject could obtain the second highest sure amount, while at the same time granting 
her opponent the chance to receive the bonus. This could be attractive if a subject 
is motivated by other-regarding preferences. We thus included a treatment SOCP, 
which was a variation of FLAT where the two rightmost boxes contain both the sali-
ent amount of 20. Figure 3 (lower part) shows both the small and large increment 
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version of SOCP. Choosing the rightmost box guarantees the highest safe amount of 
20, while also, at least theoretically, granting the other player the chance to obtain 
the bonus by selecting the second, inner box that also contains 20. On the other 
hand, a purely self-interested individual should not choose the rightmost box, since 
it is weakly dominated by the inner 20 for all possible beliefs. Table 7 (lower part) 
presents the value of reasoning for this variant for each step.
As a proxy for prosociality we measured the social value orientation (SVO; Mur-
phy et al. 2011) of each subject using a computerized version (Crosetto et al. 2012). 
We used a scaled version of the six primary items in which subjects were asked to 
choose among different allocations of points between themselves and a randomly 
selected partner. For the SVO task one of the six items was randomly selected and 
paid out using a ring matching procedure, that is, each subject received two pay-
ments of up to 25 points, one as a sender and one as a receiver. A higher SVO score 
indicates that a subject is more prosocial.
In SOCP, 36 out of 128 subjects chose the rightmost box at least once. However, 
we found no difference in SVO scores between subjects choosing the rightmost box 
at least once and those who never chose it (Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test, N = 128 , 
z = − 1.068 , p = 0.2857 ), which speaks against the social-preference interpretation. 
Next, we consider the relative frequency of choosing the rightmost box across all 
four instances of SOCP per subject (see Fig. A.2, Online Appendix). We ran a frac-
tional logit regression for this relative frequency with the SVO score as an inde-
pendent variable. The coefficient of SVO (  = 0.0160 ) is positive but not significant 
( p = 0.4032 ). Summarizing, we find no evidence that the prosocial motive of grant-
ing the opponent the chance to obtain a bonus is a driver of behavior in the 11–20 
game.
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